eugridpma-announce September 2006

eugridpma-announce@nikhef.nl

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EUGridPMA accredited CAs and OpenSSL vulnerability CVE-2006-4339
by David Groep 22 Sep '06

22 Sep '06

Dear CAs, Relying Parties, Users, and all others interested, In this announcement of the EUGridPMA: 1. Impact of OpenSSL RSA key handling vulnerability (CVE-2006-4339) and the EUGridPMA accredited CAs We hope that you find this update useful and welcome any comments you may have. Also, feel free to redistribute this information widely as you see appropriate. Regards, David Groep For more information about this newsletter and the mailing list, please refer to the EUGridPMA web site at http://www.eugridpma.org/ ========================================================================= 1. Impact of OpenSSL RSA key handling vulnerability (CVE-2006-4339) ========================================================================= Recently, a vulnerability has been identified in OpenSSL, which could be exploited by attackers to bypass security restrictions. This flaw is due to an error when handling and verifying RSA keys with exponent 3, which could be exploited by attackers to forge PKCS #1 v1.5 signatures and bypass security verifications. This affects only OpenSSL 0.9.7j and prior and OpenSSL 0.9.8b and prior. (see http://www.frsirt.com/english/advisories/2006/3453) In order to aid relying parties in the risk assessment, the EUGridPMA has requested an investigation of all certificates issues by any of the Certification Authorities accredited by the PMA, to see if any of these have issued certificates based on an RSA key with public exponent 3. All authorities have completed the audit and provided their findings to the PMA. In the review, 12 certificates were found for which the exponent of the RSA public key is 3: - the INFN CA (covering Italy) has issued in total 10 certificates with exponents 3, 5, or 7, of which 6 are still valid. In all these cases, the certificates were issues to Cisco VPN hardware equipment. The INFN CA is currently investigating whether these Cisco VPN systems are able to generate key pairs with another exponent. All other certificates were based on a key pair with exponent 65537 - the SWITCH Server CA (covering Switzerland) has issued 1 (one) certificate with exponent 3, also issued to a Cisco VPN system, which has since expired. All active certificates from any SWITCH CA have exponents different from 3. - the UK e-Science CA (covering the UK) has issued 1 (one) certificate with exponent 3, which has since expired. All active certificates from the UK e-Science CA have exponent 65537. All other accrdited CAs have reported that all their certificates are based on RSA key pairs with exponent 65537 (and these certificates are thus not affected by this vulnerability): CyGrid (Cyprus) IUCC (Israel) NorduGrid (Denmark, Sweden, Normay, Finland, Iceland) DataGrid-ES (Spain) BEGrid (Belgium) SiGNET (Slovenia) EstonianGrid (Estonia) SWITCH (Switzerland) NIIF/Hungarnet (Hungary) BalticGrid (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) CERN (CERN) ArmeSFO (Armenia) CNRS Grid-FR (France and catch-all) CESNET (Czech republic) DutchGrid (The Netherlands) GermanGrid (Germany, FZK) HellasGrid (Greece) Grid-Ireland (Republic of Ireland) PolishGrid (Poland) LIP (Portugal) Russian DataGrid (Russia) SlovakGrid (Slovakia) DoEGrids (USA and LCG catch-all) Grid-PK (Pakistan) SEE-GRID Regional (South East European regional catch-all) AustrianGrid (Austria) DFN (Germany) RDIG (Russia) TR-Grid (Turkey) pkIRISGrid (Spain) SRCE (Croatia) GridCanana (Canada) CAs have implemented measures to prevent signing of such key pairs where possible. The INFN CA is currently investigating whether the Cisco VPN systems can generate key pairs with another exponent, but in that case the certificates are not usually used in a Grid context in combination with OpenSSL.

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New IGTF distribution version 1.9 available
by David Groep 11 Sep '06

11 Sep '06

Dear CAs, Relying Parties, Users, and all others interested, In this announcement of the EUGridPMA: 1. New IGTF distribution version 1.9 available We hope that you find this update useful and welcome any comments you may have. Also, feel free to redistribute this information widely as you see appropriate. Regards, David Groep For more information about this newsletter and the mailing list, please refer to the EUGridPMA web site at https://www.eugridpma.org/ ========================================================================= 1. New IGTF distribution version 1.9 available ========================================================================= A new distribution of Accredited Authorities by the EUGridPMA, based on the IGTF Common Source, is now available. It includes the newly accredited Authorities by all IGTF Members. This is version 1.9, release 1, and it is now available for download from the Repository at https://www.eugridpma.org/distribution/igtf/current/ or https://www.eugridpma.org/distribution/igtf/1.9/ Changes from 1.8 to 1.9 ----------------------- (11 September 2006) * New SiGNET CA (with 2048-bit key length) and new Subject DN (SI) * New HellasGrid CA (both Root and EE) issue 2006 added (GR) * Modified CINC Root and CINC SDC CA certificate extensions: removed SubjectAltName and IssuerAltName. (CN) * Updated extendedKeyUsage and nsCertType extension in AustrianGrid CA (AT) You can download the new packages and install them at your convenience. If you part of a coordinated-deployment project (such as OSG, EGEE, LCG, DEISA, NAREGI or others) you may want to await your project announcement before installing this release. Next Release ------------ The next release of the CA RPMs is to be expected in October 2006 (of course barring special circumstances). ========================================================================= STANDARD CLAUSES AND REPEATED NOTICES: Distribution information ========================================================================= Notice on directory structure ----------------------------- *** ONLY CAs IN THE "accredited/" DIRECTORY and THE CAs INSTALLED USING THE ca_policy_igtf-classic-1.9-1.noarch.rpm ARE ACCREDITED Do *not* install certificates from the "worthless/" or "experimental/", directories, except if you yourself review and accept their policy and practice statement. The EUGridPMA provides these certificates in this format for your convenience only, and to allow graceful changeover for legacy installations. *** The Fermilab Kerberized CA, although not an accredited CA according to the "classic" profile, has been available from the EUGridPMA repository before in the "others/" directory. Due to the reorganization, this authority has moved to the "experimental/" area. When the KCA has been accepted by the TAGPMA, the location of this authority will change. *** All individual CAs packages, as well as the bundles, have the same (common) version number "1.9" and release "1". Distribution formats -------------------- * the distribution traditionally contained a set of RPMs and tar-balls per accredited authorities, as well as meta-RPMs that depends on the RPMs of those accredited. * the "tar-bundle" that can be used to install the authorities in a local trust directory using the "./configure && make install" mechanism has been renamed to avoid confusion. It is called: igtf-policy-installation-bundle-1.9.tar.gz It has the same functionality and can still be found in the "accredited/" subdirectory. * the accredited directory now contains two additional tar-balls that contain, respectively, *all* "classic" and "slcs" accredited CAs: igtf-preinstalled-bundle-classic-1.9.tar.gz igtf-preinstalled-bundle-slcs-1.9.tar.gz (note there are no SLCS-accredited authorities at this time) * those CAs whose key-length is less than 4095 bits are also available in a Java KeyStore (JKS), whose password is "eugridpma". These is both a JKS for each individual CA, as well as a "igtf-policy-accredited-classic-1.9.jks" in the "accredited/jks/" sub-directory. APT and Yum ----------- As always, the repository is suitable for "yum" based automatic updates, by adding to the yum.conf file: [eugridpma] name=EUGridPMA baseurl=http://www.eugridpma.org/distribution/igtf/current/ gpgcheck=1 Also "apt" is supported. For details, see http://www.eugridpma.org/distribution/igtf/current/apt/README.txt Large deployment projects are kindly requested to mirror these directories in their own distribution repositories. RPM GPG signing --------------- Also this new RPM distribution is distributed with GPG-signed RPMs. The key (ID 3CDBBC71) has been uploaded to the public key servers, along with my signature as the EUGridPMA Chair (keyID 6F298418). The key is also contained in the repository. You will need this key if you enable GPG checking for automatic updates in "yum" or "apt". Please remember to validate this distribution against the TACAR trusted repository (https://www.tacar.org/) where possible. Suggestions ----------- If you have suggestions or improvements for the distribution format, to have it better suit your needs, please contact the PMA at <info(a)eugridpma.org>. Note that there is be a common distribution format across the entire IGTF (i.e. all three PMAs). -- David Groep ** National Institute for Nuclear and High Energy Physics, PDP/Grid group ** ** Room: H1.56 Phone: +31 20 5922179, PObox 41882, NL-1009DB Amsterdam NL **

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eugridpma-announce September 2006