Dear CAs, Relying Parties, Users, and all others interested,
In this announcement of the IGTF:
1. Updated IGTF distribution version 1.27 available
2. Fetch-crl utlity version 2.7.0 released
=========================================================================
1. Updated IGTF distribution version 1.27 available
=========================================================================
A new distribution of Accredited Authorities by the EUGridPMA, based
on the IGTF Common Source, is now available. It includes the newly
accredited Authorities by all IGTF Members and retires expiring CA
certificates. This is version 1.27, release 1, and it is now available for
download from the Repository (and mirrors) at
https://dist.eugridpma.info/distribution/igtf/current/
Changes from 1.26 to 1.27
-------------------------
* Corrected signing namespace for BEGrid2008 CA (BE)
* Added NERSC SLCS CA (US)
* ASGCCA-2007 changed signature algorithm from MD5 to SHA1 (TW)
* Added new CNRS2 hierarchy: CNRS2 -> CNRS2-Projets -> CNRS2-Grid-FR (FR)
* Updated IUCC root certificate (IL)
* Obsoleted EstonianGrid CA (EE)
If you part of a coordinated-deployment project (such as OSG, EGEE, LCG,
DEISA, NAREGI or others) you may want to await your project announcement
before installing this release.
The download repository is also mirrored by the APGridPMA at
https://www.apgridpma.org/distribution/igtf/current
Distribution format changes
---------------------------
Note that the location of the igtf-policy-installation-bundle tar-ball
has changed in release 1.26. It is now in the root of the distribution
area, as it contains also all worthless and experimental CAs.
The per-profile meta-data files (ca_policy_igtf-*.info) as well as the
top-level meta-data file (ca_policy_igtf.info) now also contain a list
of obsoleted CAs. Previously, this information was only embedded in the
RPM distribution. The "obsoletes" attribute contains a comma-separated
list of aliases for all CAs that have been (temporarily) withdrawn
for any reason.
Next Release
------------
The next release of the distribution is expected on Monday, 2 March 2009.
=========================================================================
2. Fetch-crl utility version 2.7.0 released
=========================================================================
The 'fetch-crl' utility is a utility to ensure that Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) are periodically retrieved from the web sites
of the respective Certification Authorities, and installed on the
local system in a trust anchor directory. It is intended for use
with those (grid) systems that follow the OpenSSL method of trust
anchor distribution.
The fetch-crl utility has been updated with bug fixes and new
functionality, as described in the CHANGES file below. The most important
change is that this version will NOT REPORT transient download errors
unless they persist for more than 24 hours. Previously, this function
was enabled by the "-a" option or the CRL_AGING_THRESHOLD, but was set
to 0 (zero) by default.
The new version of fetch-crl can be obained from the IGTF mirror sites
and at
https://dist.eugridpma.info/distribution/util/fetch-crl/
where you can retrieve version 2.7.0 as well as older versions.
Changes in version EGP 2.7.0
----------------------------
* Warnings and errors are now counted. If there are errors in the download
or verification process for one or more CRLs, the exit status will be 1;
if there are errors in the local setup or in the script invocation, the
exit status will be 2.
* The installed CRLs no longer have the textual representation of the CRL,
but only the PEM data blob, thus reducing IO and memory requirements.
* the CRL aging threshold is now set by default to 24 hours. The previous
default was 0. The CRL aging threshold is set in the config file using
CRL_AGING_THRESHOLD=<xx>, or with the "-a" command-line argument.
* Default network timeouts reduced to 10 seconds (was 30) and retries to 2
* Added caching and conditional downloading. When CACHEDIR is set, the
original downloads are preserved and wget timestamping mode enabled.
When the content did not change, only the timestamp on the installed
CRL is updated. If SLOPPYCRLHASHES is set, the has is calculated based
on the name of the crl_url file, otherwise it is taken from the CRL itself.
- The CACHEDIR must be exclusively writable by the user running fetch-crl
- Setting CACHEDIR significantly reduced the bandwidth used by fetch-crl
* Added RESETPATHMODE setting in sysconfig. It defines whether or not to
re-set $PATH to "/bin:/usr/bin" before start. The search for OpenSSL
may be done based on the old path.
yes=always replace; searchopenssl=search for openssl first and then reset;
no=keep original path, whatever that may be (may be empty if called from cron)
Default="yes". This replaces the hard-coded path in the tool.
* Hidden "FORCE_OVERWRITE" option now has a regular name. This is backwards-
compatible. Set FORCE_OVERWRITE=yes if you want files overwritten that
have a CRL-like name and ought to have CRL content, but currently do not.
* Addresses gLite Savannah bugs 28418 and 29559. Bug 27023 is partially
addressed. Bug 20062 can be remedied with WGET_OPTS arguments.
Addresses OSG ticket 4673.
=========================================================================
STANDARD CLAUSES AND REPEATED NOTICES
=========================================================================
Subscribing to the EUGridPMA Newsletter
---------------------------------------
This newsletter carries IGTF information intended for relying parties.
For more information about this newsletter and how to subscribe,
refer to the EUGridPMA web site at https://www.eugridpma.org/
What is contained in the IGTF Trust Anchor Distribution
-------------------------------------------------------
*** ONLY CAs IN THE "accredited/" DIRECTORY and THE CAs INSTALLED
USING THE ca_policy_igtf-classic-<VERSION>-1.noarch.rpm ARE ACCREDITED
Do *not* install certificates from the "worthless/" or "experimental/",
directories, except if you yourself review and accept their policy and
practice statement. The EUGridPMA provides these certificates in
this format for your convenience only, and to allow graceful changeover
for legacy installations.
*** All individual CAs packages, as well as the bundles, have the same
(common) version number and release.
Distribution formats
--------------------
* the distribution containes RPMs and tar-balls of each accredited authority,
as well as meta-RPMs that depends on the RPMs of those accredited.
* the tar "bundle" can be used to install the authorities in a local trust
anchor directory using the "./configure && make install" process:
igtf-policy-installation-bundle-<VERSION>.tar.gz
* the accredited directory contains tar-balls for all "classic", "mics",
and "slcs" accredited CAs:
igtf-preinstalled-bundle-classic-<VERSION>.tar.gz
igtf-preinstalled-bundle-slcs-<VERSION>.tar.gz
igtf-preinstalled-bundle-mics-<VERSION>.tar.gz
* those CAs whose key-length is less than or equal to 2048 bits are also
available in a Java KeyStore (JKS), whose password is "" (empty string).
These is both a JKS for each individual CA, as well as a
"igtf-policy-accredited-classic-<VERSION>.jks" in the "accredited/jks/"
sub-directory (also for -slcs and -mics).
APT and Yum
-----------
As always, the repository is suitable for "yum" based automatic updates,
by adding to the yum.conf file:
[eugridpma]
name=EUGridPMA
baseurl=http://dist.eugridpma.info/distribution/igtf/current/
gpgcheck=1
Also "apt" is supported. For details, see
https://dist.eugridpma.info/distribution/igtf/current/apt/README.txt
Large deployment projects are kindly requested to mirror these directories
in their own distribution repositories.
RPM GPG signing
---------------
Also this new RPM distribution is distributed with GPG-signed RPMs. The
key (ID 3CDBBC71) has been uploaded to the public key servers, along with
my signature as the EUGridPMA Chair (keyID 6F298418). The key is also
contained in the repository. You will need this key if you enable GPG
checking for automatic updates in "yum" or "apt".
Please remember to validate this distribution against the TACAR
trusted repository (https://www.tacar.org/) where possible.
Suggestions
-----------
If you have suggestions or improvements for the distribution format,
to have it better suit your needs, please contact the PMA at
<info(a)eugridpma.org>. Note that there is be a common distribution format
across the entire IGTF (i.e. all three PMAs).
Dear IGTF relying parties,
The OpenSSL Security Team released an advisory [1] on January 7th,
regarding incorrect checks for malformed signatures when DSA or
ECDSA keys are used. The IGTF Risk Assessment Team (RAT) [2]
would like to inform you that NONE of the IGTF-accredited
certification authorities use such keys to sign any certificate.
This means this vulnerability does not constitute any risk to
relying parties when they authenticate a server presenting a
certificates issued by an IGTF-accredited CA.
None of the CAs accredited by the IGTF issue, or have issued in the
past, certificates using signature algorithms other than RSA.
On behalf of the IGTF/IGTF RAT
Sincerely,
Jim Basney
David Groep
Vinod Rebello
Willy Weisz
[1] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20090107.txt
[2] http://tagpma.es.net/wiki/bin/view/IGTF-RAT
--
David Groep
** Nikhef, Dutch National Institute for Sub-atomic Physics,PDP/Grid group **
** Room: H1.56 Phone: +31 20 5922179, PObox 41882, NL-1009DB Amsterdam NL **